Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue rose 20.4% to NZD 96.7m from NZD 80.3m, reversing the prior-year decline caused by depleted inventory. Despite that, the P&L moved backwards: profit before tax swung from a NZD 4.9m profit to a NZD 3.9m loss (a 178.5% decline), and NPAT fell from NZD 4.6m to a NZD 4.0m loss. Operating cash flow, however, improved dramatically to an inflow of NZD 3.5m from an outflow of NZD 27.3m, a NZD 30.8m swing driven by inventory running down from NZD 29.3m to NZD 23.7m. Cash on hand fell to NZD 4.0m from NZD 26.6m, and gross borrowings of NZD 14.8m appeared on the balance sheet (prior year nil disclosed), implying net debt of about NZD 10.8m. Total equity contracted 26.9% to NZD 39.8m. No dividend is proposed.
What matters
- The loss is concentrated in H1. H1 NPAT was a NZD 8.1m loss, which implies H2 NPAT of roughly NZD 4.1m and H2 revenue of NZD 54.6m against H1 revenue of NZD 42.1m. The exit run-rate is therefore materially better than the headline annual loss suggests, and this is the single most important read on earnings direction.
- Cash quality and balance-sheet shape diverged. Operating cash flow turned positive, but the combination of a NZD 22.6m cash drawdown and NZD 14.8m of new borrowings shows the working-capital relief was not enough on its own — the company leaned on both liquidity and debt in FY25. Pre-lease free cash flow was only NZD 1.0m despite capex being cut to NZD 2.5m from NZD 4.0m.
- Return on equity turned negative. ROE went from about 8.5% to −10.2%, and equity fell NZD 14.7m. The prior-year signalled "return to dividends by 2026" now looks harder to underwrite without a sustained H2-style earnings rate.
Expectations
No FY26 guidance, forward-work backlog, or quantified target was disclosed in the supplied material, so there is no management bar to measure against. The implied second-half shape is the most useful anchor: H2 revenue of NZD 54.6m and an implied H2 NPAT of NZD 4.1m suggest the business can generate profits at scale once volumes normalise, but annualising either figure would overstate what the filing actually supports given no commentary on order book, demand run-rate, or margin trajectory beyond the interim note of "margin compression" in carpet.
Quality of result
Much of the cash improvement is timing- and inventory-driven rather than earnings-driven. Inventory fell NZD 5.7m, contributing meaningfully to the NZD 30.8m OCF swing, while receivables rose 26.6% to NZD 10.6m and receivable days drifted to 39.8 from 37.9. Capex was also cut by NZD 1.5m. Strip those out and the underlying operating performance is a full-year loss — the P&L is the cleaner read, and on a PBT basis (the more useful measure here given the small tax distortion that actually deepened the loss), the business went backwards by NZD 8.8m. What is durable is the H2 earnings recovery and the evidence that the rebuilt supply chain can convert revenue to cash; what is timing-driven is the size of the OCF swing itself, which will not repeat at the same magnitude.
Unresolved
- Segment splits between Carpet and Wool are referenced but not quantified in the supplied excerpts, so the mix and margin drivers of the H2 recovery are opaque.
- The NZD 14.8m of borrowings has no disclosed maturity, covenant, or facility headroom in the supplied data, and net debt has no comparable prior-year figure.
- No gross margin, EBITDA, or non-GAAP reconciliation is provided, so the split between volume recovery and price/cost effects cannot be tested.
- The FY26 dividend signal given a year ago is not reaffirmed in the supplied excerpts.
This briefing cannot assess order book, forward demand indicators, or segment-level profitability because those disclosures are not present in the supplied extraction.
Key metrics
| Metric | FY25 | FY24 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $96.7m | $80.3m | +20.4% ↑ |
| Net profit after tax | −$4b | $4.6b | -187.1% ↓ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | $3.5b | −$27.3b | +112.8% ↑ |
| Profit before tax | −$3.9b | $4.9b | -178.6% ↓ |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $4b | $26.6b | -84.8% ↓ |
| Total assets | $72.1m | $94.9m | -24.0% ↓ |
Reference: annolyse.ai/briefings/brw-fy25
Analytical metrics
| Metric | FY25 | FY24 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effective tax rate | n/m (loss period) | 6.1% | current loss period |
| FCF pre-lease | $1.0m | −$31.3m | +$32.3m |
| FCF / NPAT | -24.0% | -674.8% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 2.6% | 5.0% | — |
| Capex | −$2.5b | −$4.0m | −$2.5b |
| Debtor days | 39.8 | 37.9 | +1.9 days |
| Trade debtors | $10.6m | $8.3m | +$2.2m |
| Net debt | $10.8m | — | — |
| Gross borrowings | $14.8m | — | — |
| ROE (annualised) | -10.2% | 8.5% | Weakening |
| HY25 share of FY25 revenue | 43.6% | — | Other half was 56.4% |
| HY25 share of FY25 NPAT | 201.5% | — | Other half was -101.5% |
| Profit from continuing operations | — | $4.6m | — |
Reference: annolyse.ai/briefings/brw-fy25
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.