MOVE FY24: second-half EBITDA turned negative as PBT loss widened to $45.3m

Revenue fell 14.5% to $293.9m and reported EBITDA collapsed 83.3% to $7.9m. The pre-tax loss widened from $7.6m to $45.3m (PBT growth -496.9%) and the NPAT loss widened to $48.1m.

The second half was substantially worse than the first. With HY24 EBITDA of $12.3m, the implied 2H EBITDA was -$4.4m, and around $37.4m of the $48.1m full-year NPAT loss landed in the second half. Total equity fell 63.7% to $27.2m, gross borrowings rose to $26.7m (all current), and net debt to reported EBITDA moved from 0.3x to 2.1x. Reported figures include roughly $19.7m of non-trading items that management excludes from normalised EBITDA of $27.6m.

Contract Logistics, the largest division at 46.6% of revenue, saw segment result fall from $11.6m to $0.6m. Freight's segment loss widened from $6.0m to $18.6m and International swung from a $1.0m profit to a $2.2m loss. This points to a group-level demand and cost-base mismatch rather than a single problem segment that can be fixed in isolation.

The trajectory worsened into the second half. A 2H EBITDA of -$4.4m after a $12.3m first half means the year did not stabilise as cost actions were taken; it weakened. This raises the bar for the FY25 turnaround management has flagged, because the run-rate exiting FY24 is below the full-year average rather than above it.

Balance-sheet flexibility has narrowed sharply. Equity has fallen to $27.2m while gross borrowings of $26.7m are now wholly classified as current against only $9.7m of cash. ROE moved from -9.6% to -177.0%. Net debt to reported EBITDA at 2.15x makes refinancing terms and any bank covenants a live sensitivity rather than a background concern.

Management points to "significant improvement targeted in FY25" and notes 2H24 normalised EBITDA was ahead of 1H24, in line with prior guidance. The statutory figures, however, are materially worse than the prior year on every income line, and the roughly $19.7m gap between reported EBITDA ($7.9m) and normalised EBITDA ($27.6m) sets a high bar for what should be treated as recurring.

The release supports a directional cost-out and demand-recovery thesis but, on the disclosed numbers, does not yet evidence a return to profitability. This matters because the second half ran below the first half on a reported basis even as the company points to normalised improvement, so investors lack a quantified bridge from FY24 actuals to FY25.

Capex was cut from $19.5m to $1.8m, a 90.5% reduction that explains most of the FCF preservation. Operating cash flow itself fell 51.4% to $18.7m, and trade debtors declined 20% to $38.7m, releasing roughly $9.7m of working capital that supports cash flow but cannot repeat at the same magnitude.

The cleaner operating read is the $45.3m pre-tax loss, which has widened nearly six-fold despite cost actions; even on the company's normalised basis, EBT of -$25.7m is materially worse than FY23. The reported OCF/EBITDA ratio of 236.4% is a denominator artefact: EBITDA shrank faster than cash flow. The economically relevant point is that FY24 cash flow was sustained by deferring investment and unwinding receivables, not by earnings — and both levers are largely spent for FY25.

This briefing cannot assess covenant headroom, refinancing terms, or the credibility of the FY25 normalisation path from the disclosures supplied.