Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue was essentially unchanged at $861.0m versus $855.8m, but earnings deteriorated at every line below. EBITDA fell 16.7% to $138.2m, operating profit fell 38.7% to $46.1m, and PBT fell 41.7% to $30.1m. Reported NPAT swung from a $8.0m profit to a $143.3m loss, a move driven almost entirely by a $173.5m income tax expense that produced an effective tax rate of about -576%. Operating cash flow fell 27.3% to $203.6m while capex rose to $303.7m, so pre-lease free cash flow swung from +$25.4m to roughly -$100.1m. Cash fell from $245.0m to $60.5m, gross borrowings rose to $609.5m, and net debt/EBITDA moved from 2.0x to 4.0x. The dividend has been suspended "until at least the end" of the stated period, against a prior-year DPS of 6.0 cents. Segment underlying EBITDA shows New Zealand down 6.5% to $271.9m and Adelaide up 9.8% to $39.6m.
What matters
- PBT is the cleaner read, and it is down 41.7%. The $143.3m reported loss is a tax-driven artefact; the underlying operating deterioration is the 41.7% PBT decline on flat revenue, implying meaningful margin compression in the core NZ business.
- Leverage has doubled on a depleting cash base. Net debt of roughly $549.0m against $138.2m EBITDA gives 4.0x leverage versus 2.0x a year ago, with cash down 75.3% to $60.5m. That combination, alongside dividend suspension, points to balance-sheet repair becoming the binding constraint on capital allocation.
- The investment cycle is outrunning cash generation. Capex at 35.3% of revenue (up from 29.8%) sits against an OCF-to-EBITDA ratio that fell from 168.8% to 147.3%. Pre-lease FCF of about -$100.1m explains most of the cash drawdown and the step-up in borrowings.
Expectations
No forward earnings target, guidance figure, or forward-work book was disclosed in the extracted material, so run-rate versus stated goals cannot be assessed. The only shape context is HY24, which showed EBITDA of $101.0m; the implied second half delivered just $37.2m of EBITDA on $420.6m of revenue, a materially weaker trajectory than the first half rather than a stable or accelerating one. The release references a regulatory-risk agenda and mid-2025 milestones for the New Zealand casinos but does not quantify their earnings impact. On the information provided, the result supports the case that H2 exit-run EBITDA is well below the first-half rate; it does not support any claim about FY25 earnings recovery.
Quality of result
Earnings quality is weak on several dimensions. Revenue was flat while EBITDA fell $27.7m, so this is margin-driven rather than volume-driven deterioration. Cash conversion was already signalled as weaker: OCF fell 27.3% against a 16.7% EBITDA decline, a clear deterioration to flag. Working capital did not rescue the number — receivable days were flat at 3.4 and inventory days were broadly unchanged, so the cash shortfall reflects operating margin and capex intensity rather than a timing swing that will reverse. The $143.3m loss is distorted by an anomalous tax charge and should not be read as a durable earnings base, but equally the non-GAAP "underlying EBITDA" figures do not come with a full bridge from statutory NPAT in the extract. The second-half step-down in EBITDA from $101.0m to $37.2m suggests the exit trajectory, not the full-year average, is the more relevant reference point.
Unresolved
- What specifically drove the $173.5m tax expense on $30.1m of PBT — deferred tax write-downs, regulatory provisions, or a one-off adjustment — and how much of it recurs.
- The composition of the H2 EBITDA collapse: how much is New Zealand regulatory-cost absorption, how much is volume, and how much is discrete provisioning.
- Banking covenant headroom at 4.0x net debt/EBITDA, and the timing of the $241.1m current interest-bearing liability.
- The expected duration of the dividend suspension and the capex profile beyond FY24, given $303.7m was spent this year.
- Whether the "underlying EBITDA" segment disclosures reconcile cleanly to the statutory $138.2m, since a full bridge was not provided.
This briefing cannot assess the underlying regulatory, licensing, and provisioning issues that appear to sit behind both the tax charge and the H2 earnings step-down, because the extracted material does not quantify them.
Key metrics
| Metric | FY24 | FY23 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $861m | $855.8m | +0.6% ↑ |
| EBITDA | $138.2m | $165.9m | -16.7% ↓ |
| Net profit after tax | −$143.3m | $8m | -1897.5% ↓ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | $203.6m | $280.1m | -27.3% ↓ |
| Declared dividend per share | — | 6.0c | — |
| Operating profit | $46.1m | $75.2m | -38.7% ↓ |
| Profit before tax | $30.1m | $51.7m | -41.7% ↓ |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $60.5m | $245m | -75.3% ↓ |
| Total assets | $2.8b | $2.9b | -2.9% ↓ |
Segment breakdown
| Segment | Current revenue | Prior revenue | Current result | Mix shift |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| New Zealand operations | — | — | $271.9m | n/a |
| SkyCity Adelaide | — | — | $39.6m | n/a |
Analytical metrics
| Metric | FY24 | FY23 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| PBT growth | -41.7% | — | cleaner earnings measure |
| Effective tax rate | -575.9% | -84.6% | — |
| OCF / EBITDA (cash conversion) | 147.3% | 168.8% | deteriorated |
| FCF pre-lease | −$100.1m | $25.4m | −$125.5m |
| FCF / NPAT | 69.8% | 317.8% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 35.3% | 29.8% | — |
| Capex | $303.7m | $254.7m | +$48.9m |
| Debtor days | 3.4 | 3.4 | +0.0 days |
| Inventory days | 3.5 | 3.7 | -0.1 days |
| Operating working capital | $16.5m | $16.6m | −$0.06m absorbed |
| Trade debtors | $8.1m | $8m | +$0.15m |
| Net debt | $549m | $326.5m | +$222.5m |
| Net debt / EBITDA | 3.97x | 1.97x | Weakening |
| Gross borrowings | $609.5m | $571.5m | +$38m |
| ROE (annualised) | -11.0% | 0.5% | Weakening |
| HY24 share of FY24 revenue | 51.2% | — | Other half was 48.8% |
| HY24 share of FY24 EBITDA | 73.1% | — | Other half was 26.9% |
| HY24 share of FY24 NPAT | -15.7% | — | Other half was 115.7% |
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.
Source-backed analysis from the filing set attached to this briefing.