Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue declined 2.6% to $769.8m, but profitability fell far harder: PBT dropped 80.4% to $6.1m and NPAT fell 82.8% to $4.8m. Management did not disclose HY23 EBITDA in the supplied excerpts, removing the most-cited comparable from last year's $68.4m print. Gross margin, by contrast, improved 188bps to 10.6% as cost of sales fell faster than revenue, meaning the collapse in earnings sat below the gross line.
The cash picture is the sharper story. Operating cash flow swung from a $117.3m inflow to a $124.7m outflow — a $241.9m year-on-year deterioration — with inventories rising 39.4% to $467.7m (inventory days up roughly 39 to 124). Cash fell to $12.4m from $40.6m, and gross borrowings rose 23.1% to $529.3m. Net debt is approximately $516.9m versus $389.4m a year earlier. No dividend is proposed.
Segment mix shifted only modestly: Synlait revenue fell to $631.2m (82.0% of group, from 83.9%) while Dairyworks grew to $138.6m. Profit was disproportionately concentrated in Dairyworks ($3.4m) versus Synlait ($1.4m) — a notable reversal of last year's $26.8m Synlait contribution.
What matters
- Cash conversion has broken. Pre-lease free cash flow was approximately -$152.1m versus +$71.2m in HY22, even though capex was lower ($27.5m versus $46.0m). The swing is almost entirely working-capital-driven, concentrated in inventory.
- Leverage is moving the wrong way. With EBITDA not disclosed this half, a current net debt/EBITDA cannot be computed, but the $127.5m increase in net debt alongside collapsing earnings is the material balance-sheet development. Prior-period net debt/EBITDA ran at about 5.7x on an HY22 annualised basis — already elevated before this half's deterioration.
- The core Synlait segment is barely profitable. Group earnings are now effectively being carried by Dairyworks, which is the smaller unit. That is a material read-through on the durability of the earnings base.
Expectations
No quantitative forward guidance or medium-term target was provided. Prior-year shape shows revenue was slightly second-half weighted (HY22 = 47.6% of FY22) but EBITDA and NPAT were first-half weighted (53.0% and 72.4% respectively). On that pattern, an FY23 NPAT anywhere near FY22's $38.5m would require a sharply better second half than HY23's $4.8m contribution suggests. Annualising current-half revenue gives roughly $1.5b, about 7.3% below FY22. The release does not support a specific FY23 trajectory either way.
Quality of result
Low. The 188bps gross margin improvement is real, but below gross margin everything deteriorated, and the result is heavily assisted/hurt by working-capital movement rather than underlying trading dynamics. PBT is the cleaner operating read here — at -80.4%, it confirms the NPAT decline is not principally a tax artefact, though the effective tax rate did rise from about 10.2% to 21.2%, widening the NPAT drop modestly. No discontinued operations were disclosed; the earnings collapse is not explained by a disposal.
Cash conversion deteriorated materially: OCF moved from 171% of prior-year EBITDA to a large outflow, driven by the $132.1m inventory build. Until inventory unwinds, reported earnings and cash will continue to diverge, and any reversal in commodity/input prices could force inventory revaluation pressure rather than a clean working-capital release.
Unresolved
- Why was HY23 EBITDA not prominently disclosed in the current excerpts when it anchored the HY22 narrative? The absence is conspicuous given the earnings collapse.
- What is the composition of the $132.1m inventory build — finished goods awaiting shipment, raw materials at elevated cost, or slow-moving stock at risk of write-down?
- What are current banking covenant headroom and net debt/EBITDA against facility tests, given gross borrowings up 23.1% and cash down 69.4%?
- What is the path back to profitability for the Synlait segment, whose result fell from $26.8m to $1.4m?
- Customer concentration is not disclosed; the earnings collapse at the Synlait segment raises the question of whether volume from a key customer has shifted.
This briefing cannot assess the operational causes of the inventory build or the company's covenant position, since neither is disclosed in the supplied excerpts.
Key metrics
| Metric | HY23 | HY22 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $769.8m | $790.6m | -2.6% ↓ |
| EBITDA | — | $68.4m | — |
| Net profit after tax | $4.8m | $27.9m | -82.8% ↓ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | −$124.7m | $117.3m | -206.3% ↓ |
| Operating profit | $22.5m | $41.4m | -45.6% ↓ |
| Profit before tax | $6.1m | $31.1m | -80.4% ↓ |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $12.4m | $40.6m | -69.4% ↓ |
| Total assets | $1.9b | $1.7b | +12.5% ↑ |
Segment breakdown
| Segment | Current revenue | Prior revenue | Current result | Mix shift |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Synlait | $631.2m | $663.8m | $1.4m | -1.9pp |
| Dairyworks | $138.6m | $126.8m | $3.4m | +2.0pp |
Analytical metrics
| Metric | HY23 | HY22 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| PBT growth | -80.3% | — | cleaner earnings measure |
| Effective tax rate | 21.2% | 10.2% | — |
| FCF pre-lease | −$152.1m | $71.2m | −$223.4m |
| FCF / NPAT | n/m | 255.2% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 3.6% | 5.8% | — |
| Capex | −$27.5m | −$46m | +$18.5m |
| Debtor days | 33.1 | 24.4 | +8.6 days |
| Inventory days | 123.7 | 84.7 | +39.0 days |
| Trade debtors | $0.01m | $0.01m | $0m |
| Net debt | $516.9m | $389.4m | +$127.5m |
| Gross borrowings | $529.3m | $430m | +$99.3m |
| ROE (annualised) | 0.6% | 3.7% | Weakening |
| HY22 share of FY22 revenue | 47.6% | — | Other half was 52.4% |
| HY22 share of FY22 EBITDA | 53.0% | — | Other half was 47.0% |
| HY22 share of FY22 NPAT | 72.4% | — | Other half was 27.6% |
| Profit from continuing operations | $4.8m | $27.9m | −$23.1m |
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.
Source-backed analysis from the filing set attached to this briefing.