Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue rose 15.9% to $18.7m from $16.1m, but every earnings line deteriorated sharply. EBITDA swung from $1.0m to -$27.6m, PBT widened from -$3.1m to -$37.7m, and NPAT moved from -$6.6m to -$38.1m. Operating cash flow collapsed from a $0.0m inflow to a $30.0m outflow, and capex tripled to $4.6m, taking pre-lease free cash flow to -$34.6m. The balance sheet tells a very different story: cash rose to $92.6m from $3.4m, total equity rose to $100.6m from $12.7m, total liabilities fell to $22.1m, and the $7.0m of prior borrowings is no longer disclosed — consistent with a material equity raise and debt repayment during the year.
What matters
- Second-half operating collapse. HY22 revenue of $17.2m implies only $1.5m of H2 revenue, and H2 EBITDA was approximately -$29.8m versus +$2.1m in H1. The full-year earnings deterioration is concentrated in the second half, not spread across the year.
- Cash burn versus cash build. The $89.2m lift in cash reflects a capital raise, not operating performance. Underlying operations consumed roughly $30.0m of cash and generated an additional $4.6m of capex, so the equity injection is effectively funding both the operating hole and a step-up in investment.
- Earnings quality signal is poor on the P&L but stabilised on the balance sheet. With gross borrowings apparently repaid and $92.6m of cash on hand, near-term solvency risk is low, but the operating run-rate implied by H2 would exhaust that buffer quickly if unaddressed.
Expectations
No quantified guidance, forward-work backlog, or stated targets are disclosed in the extract, so this release cannot be judged against management-set benchmarks. Against the HY22 shape that was available, the full-year result is materially worse than the half implied: HY22 delivered 91.8% of FY22 revenue and a small positive EBITDA, whereas H2 delivered almost no revenue and a $29.8m EBITDA loss. The release supports a view that H2 carried most of the damage; it does not support any inference about a recovery trajectory into the next period.
Quality of result
The durable component of this result is hard to identify. The P&L has no disclosed non-recurring or separately adjusted items, and there is no reconciliation from EBITDA to statutory loss, so the $28.6m EBITDA swing cannot be decomposed from the extract into impairments, write-downs, or underlying trading. Cash conversion deteriorated sharply: operating cash flow of -$30.0m is worse than EBITDA of -$27.6m, and trade receivables jumped to $4.9m from $0.2m, lifting receivable days from about 5 to about 96. That working-capital build is a further drag on cash rather than a source of it. Capex at 24.6% of revenue (versus 5.7% prior) is elevated relative to the current revenue base. On balance, this looks like a reset year rather than a timing-driven dip.
Unresolved
- What is the split between underlying trading loss and any impairment, fair-value, or acquisition-related charges inside the -$27.6m EBITDA figure?
- Why did H2 revenue fall to about $1.5m — is this a site-closure, disposal, or trading-disruption effect, and is the H1 run-rate still representative of the continuing footprint?
- What drove trade receivables from $0.2m to $4.9m when H2 trading was minimal, and how much is collectable?
- With borrowings no longer disclosed and cash at $92.6m, what is the intended use of the capital raised, and what operating cash burn should investors expect to consume it?
- No dividend was declared in FY22 versus a prior-period 3.0 cent distribution; capital return policy going forward is not addressed.
This briefing cannot assess segment mix, reconciliation of EBITDA to statutory loss, or forward trading shape, because the extract does not disclose current-period segment data, a non-GAAP bridge, or guidance.
Key metrics
| Metric | FY22 | FY21 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $18.7m | $16.1m | +15.9% ↑ |
| EBITDA | −$27.6m | $1.0m | -2884.3% ↓ |
| Net profit after tax | −$38.1m | −$6.6m | -478.8% ↓ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | −$30.0m | $0.0m | -249733.3% ↓ |
| Declared dividend per share | — | −3.0c | — |
| Profit before tax | −$37.7m | −$3.1m | -1119.3% ↓ |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $92.6m | $3.4m | +2622.5% ↑ |
| Total assets | $122.6m | $36.4m | +236.7% ↑ |
Analytical metrics
| Metric | FY22 | FY21 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| OCF / EBITDA (cash conversion) | 108.4% | n/m | deteriorated |
| FCF pre-lease | −$34.6m | $11.1m | −$45.6m |
| FCF / NPAT | 90.7% | -168.2% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 24.6% | 5.7% | — |
| Capex | −$4.6m | $924.0m | −$928.6m |
| Debtor days | 95.9 | 4.7 | +91.2 days |
| Trade debtors | $4.9m | $208.0m | −$203.1m |
| Gross borrowings | — | $7b | — |
| ROE (annualised) | -37.9% | -51.8% | Strengthening |
| HY22 share of FY22 revenue | 91.8% | — | Other half was 8.2% |
| HY22 share of FY22 EBITDA | -7.6% | — | Other half was 107.6% |
| HY22 share of FY22 NPAT | 2.0% | — | Other half was 98.0% |
| Profit from continuing operations | — | −$3.1b | — |
| Discontinued operation after tax | — | −$3.5b | — |
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.