Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue rose 16.3% to $18.7m, but every line below it reversed direction. Operating profit swung from a $0.6m profit to a $1.8m loss, PBT moved from $0.4m to a $2.4m loss, and NPAT went from $1.1m profit to a $1.8m loss. Operating cash flow swung from a $2.2m inflow to a $0.1m outflow. On the balance sheet, cash fell from $2.8m to $1.2m, gross borrowings rose from $0.05m to $0.9m, and total equity contracted 17.7% to $11.4m. ROE inverted from roughly 8% to -161.7%.
Segment mix is unchanged in shape but not in quality: Kilimanjaro Consulting still produced 94% of revenue, growing to $17.6m, but its segment result collapsed from $2.4m to $0.4m. iSell's losses widened slightly to $1.2m on $1.1m of revenue, and the corporate cost centre deepened to -$0.9m.
What matters
- Core-segment margin destruction. Kilimanjaro grew revenue roughly 15.6% but contributed only $0.4m of segment profit versus $2.4m prior — an 85% fall. Group revenue growth is being consumed by cost growth in the one division that actually earns money.
- Cash generation flipped. Pre-lease free cash flow moved from a $2.0m surplus to a $0.3m deficit. FCF/NPAT conversion fell from 184% to an effectively loss-on-loss relationship. With capex steady at ~1% of revenue, the swing is almost entirely operating, not investment-driven.
- Leverage direction. The group remains in net cash ($0.4m), but the cushion narrowed from $2.8m, and borrowings scaled 17x off a tiny base. Combined with negative OCF and equity attrition, this is a clearly weakening balance-sheet direction even before considering any intangibles review.
Expectations
No quantified forward target or formal guidance was disclosed. Commentary cites price increases, expected single-brand synergies in Kilimanjaro, and a "seasonally stronger second half" as supports for future profitability, but these are qualitative.
The second-half shape is informative: HY22 carried 55.4% of the full-year NPAT loss, so H2 losses narrowed ($1.0m H1 loss versus an implied $0.8m H2 loss) and OCF split roughly evenly. That is consistent with price-rise traction, but it does not itself evidence a return to the prior Kilimanjaro profit profile, which is the variable that determines whether FY23 reverses the swing.
Quality of result
Low. PBT is the cleaner read here because tax distorted both periods (FY22 benefit of $0.2m on a $2.4m loss; FY21 carried a much larger relative benefit), and on that basis the business is materially loss-making at the operating line. The deterioration is not explained by a discontinued operation, disposal loss, or non-recurring item in the supplied material — no adjusted EBITDA or non-GAAP reconciliation was provided, so the $2.4m pre-tax loss stands as the reported operating outcome.
Cash conversion deteriorated materially, and it did so alongside the P&L rather than against it, which argues the result is genuine operating weakness rather than a timing or working-capital artefact. The FY21 trade receivables base was $2.6m (~60 days), but the FY22 receivables figure was not supplied, so working-capital movement cannot be fully reconstructed.
Unresolved
- What is the FY22 trade-receivables position, and how much of the OCF swing is working-capital versus trading?
- What drove the Kilimanjaro margin collapse on growing revenue — wage inflation, delivery mix, integration costs, or pricing lag? The "more complex than expected" commentary is not quantified.
- Is iSell's ~$1.2m annual loss funded indefinitely, and at what licensing-revenue threshold does it break even?
- What are the BNZ facility covenants referenced in the HY22 commentary, and are they still in waiver territory given FY22's loss?
- No dividend, NTA per share, customer concentration, or forward-work backlog was disclosed.
This briefing cannot assess valuation, covenant headroom, or the durability of the stated price-increase and single-brand synergy thesis, because no share-price input, covenant detail, or quantified forward target was supplied.
Key metrics
| Metric | FY22 | FY21 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $18.7m | $16.1m | +16.3% ↑ |
| Net profit after tax | −$1836m | $1098m | -267.2% ↓ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | −$146m | $2215m | -106.6% ↓ |
| Operating profit | −$1782m | $629m | -383.3% ↓ |
| Profit before tax | −$2420m | $370m | -754.1% ↓ |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $1216m | $2806m | -56.7% ↓ |
| Total assets | $21.9m | $22.8m | -4.1% ↓ |
Reference: annolyse.ai/briefings/ens-fy22
Segment breakdown
| Segment | Current revenue | Prior revenue | Current result | Mix shift |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kilimanjaro Consulting | $17.6m | $15.2m | $0.4m | -0.6pp |
| iSell | $1.1m | $0.9m | −$1.2m | +0.4pp |
| Corporate | $0.0m | $0.0m | −$0.9m | +0.1pp |
Reference: annolyse.ai/briefings/ens-fy22
Analytical metrics
| Metric | FY22 | FY21 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effective tax rate | n/m (loss period) | -108.6% | current loss period |
| FCF pre-lease | −$0.3m | $2.0m | −$2.4m |
| FCF / NPAT | 17.8% | 184.4% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 1.0% | 1.2% | — |
| Capex | $181.0m | $0.2m | +$180.8m |
| Trade debtors | — | $2.6m | — |
| Net debt | −$0.4m | −$2.8m | +$2.4m |
| Gross borrowings | $853.0m | $0.1m | +$853.0m |
| ROE (annualised) | -161.7% | 8.0% | Weakening |
| HY22 share of FY22 revenue | 48.0% | — | Other half was 52.0% |
| HY22 share of FY22 NPAT | 55.4% | — | Other half was 44.6% |
| Profit from continuing operations | −$2193.0m | $0.8m | −$2193.8m |
Reference: annolyse.ai/briefings/ens-fy22
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX/ASX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.