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KMD Brands (KMD) / HY24

Sales down 14.5% drove KMD to a $10.4m loss; dividend cut to zero

Kathmandu swung to a segment loss and group leverage rose to 1.49x EBITDA, even as inventory release lifted operating cash flow.

Consumer / Retail apparel

KMD revenue trajectory

Revenue context before the current result.

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HY26 was $505.4m, versus $989m in FY25.

KMD EBITDA margin

EBITDA margin across covered periods.

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HY26 was 12.5%, versus 5.1% in FY25.

KMD operating cash flow

Operating cash flow across covered periods.

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HY26 was $25.6m, versus $126.2m in FY25.

KMD working-capital movement

Operating working-capital absorption or release by reporting period.

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HY26 was -$31.3m, versus $11.3m in FY25.
Release date
19 March 2024
Published
21 April 2026
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Key metrics

Numbers worth scanning first

HY24 vs HY23

Revenue

$468.6m

-14.5% ↓ vs $547.9m

EBITDA

$64.4m

-29.1% ↓ vs $90.8m

Net profit after tax

−$10.4m

Suppressed: metric quality flags mark this value as unsuitable for normal comparison.

Net cash inflow from operating activities

$42.2m

+41.0% ↑ vs $29.9m

Interim dividend per share

0.0c

Suppressed: metric quality flags mark this value as unsuitable for normal comparison.

Operating profit

$0.48m

Suppressed: metric quality flags mark this value as unsuitable for normal comparison.

Profit before tax

−$12.8m

Suppressed: metric quality flags mark this value as unsuitable for normal comparison.

Cash and cash equivalents

$34m

-60.3% ↓ vs $85.6m

What changed

Group sales fell 14.5% to NZD 468.6m, and the operating loss flowed through to a NZD 12.8m loss before tax (HY23: NZD 21.2m profit) and a NZD 10.4m net loss (HY23: NZD 13.2m profit), an NPAT swing of -179.2%

Reported EBITDA dropped 29.1% to NZD 64.4m, while the company's underlying EBITDA was disclosed at NZD 15.1m, down 66.8%.

The board declared no interim dividend, versus 3.0 cents in HY23. Operating cash flow rose 41.0% to NZD 42.2m, but the closing cash balance fell 60.3% to NZD 34.0m and gross borrowings of NZD 130.2m left net debt at NZD 96.2m, lifting net debt to EBITDA to 1.49x from 0.93x.

By segment, Kathmandu swung to a NZD 8.3m loss (HY23: NZD 5.9m profit) on revenue down 21.5%; Oboz turned slightly negative; Rip Curl remained the dominant earner at NZD 27.4m on 59.4% of group revenue.

What matters

Kathmandu drove the group loss

Kathmandu revenue fell 21.5% to NZD 152.3m and the segment result deteriorated by NZD 14.2m, more than the entire group EBIT decline. Rip Curl earnings held up reasonably (NZD 27.4m vs NZD 30.5m), so the read is that group profitability is now hostage to a single brand's recovery rather than a uniform consumer slowdown.

Leverage is rising even though cash flow looks better. OCF/EBITDA improved to 65.5% from 32.9%, but cash fell NZD 51.6m year on year and net debt rose to NZD 96.2m. Net debt to EBITDA at 1.49x is still moderate, but the trajectory matters because the board has chosen to suspend the dividend rather than draw on the balance sheet — a signal that management is prioritising headroom over shareholder distributions.

Gross margin held, costs did not flex. Gross margin was essentially flat at 58.8% (+10bps), so the earnings collapse is an operating-leverage story on a fixed cost base rather than a pricing or sourcing problem. That frames the recovery question as a sales-volume question.

Expectations

No FY24 numerical guidance is supplied in the materials

The historical shape is meaningful: in FY23, the second half delivered roughly 50.3% of full-year revenue, 54.6% of EBITDA, and 62.6% of NPAT, so the group is structurally second-half weighted. Annualising current run-rate revenue gives NZD 937.3m, around 15% below FY23's NZD 1.1bn record, but that simple extrapolation overstates the likely full-year miss if Kathmandu's winter trading recovers.

The release does not quantify trading into the second half or commit to a cost-out target, so the gap between current run-rate and any plausible FY24 outcome is unresolved on the materials provided. The dividend suspension signals the board is not yet confident on the second-half shape.

Quality of result

The headline reported EBITDA of NZD 64.4m sits well above the company's underlying EBITDA of NZD 15.1m, with the gap principally reflecting IFRS 16 lease accounting and items the company excludes from underlying

The underlying figure is the cleaner read on operating economics, and at NZD 15.1m down 66.8% it is consistent with the swing to a statutory loss.

Operating cash flow of NZD 42.2m looks strong against reported EBITDA but is partly a working-capital release: trade debtors fell NZD 9.0m and inventory came down NZD 5.2m versus HY23. That said, inventory days extended to 121.8 from 105.9, meaning the dollar reduction in inventory has been more than offset by the sales decline — stock is moving more slowly through the channel.

  • Free cash flow pre-lease: NZD 29.6m (HY23: NZD 18.6m), against an NZD 10.4m net loss — so reported FCF/NPAT of -283.8% reflects a working-capital tailwind, not earnings durability.

Unresolved

Open questions

What specific cost actions has the board taken in response to the Kathmandu sales decline, and what is their annualised value?
Why have inventory days extended to 121.8 from 105.9 despite the absolute inventory drawdown, and what is the markdown risk by brand?
Will the bank facility headroom and covenants accommodate further trading weakness if the second half does not recover as historically shaped?
What is the board's framework for restoring the dividend, and is FY24 NPAT coverage a precondition?
How is Rip Curl's wholesale order book trending into 2H, given it now carries 59.4% of group revenue and effectively all the group's earnings?

This briefing cannot assess current trading momentum into the second half, the FY24 cost programme, or covenant headroom, because none of those are quantified in the supplied materials.

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Ask follow-up questions about KMD Brands's HY24 result.

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What specific cost actions has the board taken in response to the Kathmandu sales decline, and what is their annualised value?Why does "Kathmandu drove the group loss" matter?How strong was the cash and earnings quality in HY24?What should I watch next for KMD after HY24?

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Data appendix

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Sources

Current period

Interim Financial Statements for the six months ended 31 January 2024 and the Independent Auditors Review Report

HY24 / financial report↗

Investor Presentation

HY24 / results presentation↗

Media Announcement

HY24 / results release↗

Results Announcement

HY24 / results announcement↗

Prior comparable period

Interim Financial Statements for the six months ended 31 January 2023 and the Independent Auditors Review Report

HY23 / financial report↗

Results Announcement

HY23 / results announcement↗

Results Announcement

HY23 / results release↗

Full-year context

Annual Integrated Report including Financial Statements and Independent Auditor's Report

FY23 / financial report↗

Results Announcement

FY23 / results announcement↗

Results Announcement

FY23 / results release↗

Release context

KMD Brands Trading Update February 2024

HY24 / commentary↗

Results of Annual Meeting

HY24 / commentary↗

Related insights

Cross-company views selected from the metrics in this briefing.

Earnings quality and statutory distortions

This result includes a statutory earnings-quality distortion flag.

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Working-capital pressure

Inventory days were 122 days, +16 days versus the prior comparable period.

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Cash conversion quality

This result converted 65.5% of EBITDA to operating cash flow, +32.6pp versus the prior comparable period.

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Leverage and balance-sheet risk

Net debt / EBITDA is 1.49x, +0.56x versus the prior comparable period.

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This briefing is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. It is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.

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