Revenue doubled to NZ$20.7m but PBT loss tripled to NZ$45.2m

What changed

Revenue rose 126.6% to NZ$20.7m from NZ$9.2m, but the cost base scaled faster: PBT loss widened to NZ$45.2m from NZ$15.2m (-198.3%) and NPAT loss widened to NZ$45.7m from NZ$15.2m (-201.2%). Operating cash outflow nearly quadrupled to NZ$37.0m from NZ$9.8m. Capex fell to NZ$5.7m from NZ$7.3m, so pre-lease free cash flow was an outflow of NZ$42.8m versus NZ$17.1m prior. Cash jumped to NZ$105.4m from NZ$52.3m and equity rose to NZ$131.1m from NZ$88.9m, implying the period was funded by a material equity injection rather than by operations. Gross borrowings were immaterial in both periods.

What matters

• Operating leverage has gone the wrong way. Revenue more than doubled, but the PBT loss grew faster than revenue, so the loss per dollar of revenue increased. With tax only a 1.0% effective rate on the current loss, PBT is the cleaner read and it confirms the deterioration is operational, not tax-driven.
• Second half was weaker, not stronger. Implied H2 revenue was NZ$9.0m against H1 of NZ$11.7m, while H2 NPAT loss of NZ$29.3m was materially worse than the H1 loss of NZ$16.4m, and H2 operating cash outflow of NZ$22.6m exceeded H1's NZ$14.4m. The shape does not suggest momentum into FY23.
• Cash position is the swing factor. The NZ$53.1m increase in cash despite a NZ$42.8m pre-lease FCF outflow points to an equity raise in the period. That extends runway but does not change the underlying burn rate.

Expectations

No quantified FY22 targets, guidance, or forward-work balance were disclosed in the supplied materials, so the result cannot be judged against management's own yardstick. Against the prior-period shape, the release disappoints on two fronts: H2 revenue was lower than H1, and H2 cash burn was higher than H1. The filing does support the view that bookings volumes recovered as travel restrictions eased (per prior-period commentary on 157% volume growth), but it does not support a read that the business is approaching operating cash breakeven at current scale.

Quality of result

The loss is durable rather than timing-driven. There is no disclosed one-off, restructuring charge, discontinued operation, or impairment that explains the gap between revenue growth and the PBT move — the widening loss reflects underlying cost growth. Cash conversion deteriorated materially: pre-lease FCF was 93.7% of the NPAT loss in FY22, broadly tracking the P&L, and working capital provided no cushion. Trade receivables rose to NZ$5.3m from NZ$1.9m, lifting receivable days to ~92.8 from ~76.8, a 16-day extension that represents a genuine working-capital drag as revenue scaled. Capex intensity fell (27.6% of revenue versus 80.0%), which is a positive, but is swamped by the operating burn. ROE weakened to -34.8% from -17.1%.

Unresolved

• Current-year EBITDA was not extracted, preventing a like-for-like non-GAAP comparison against the prior NZ$11.8m EBITDA loss, and no reconciliation was provided.
• The size, timing, and pricing of the implied capital raise are not in the extraction, so effective runway and dilution cannot be quantified.
• No segment, customer-concentration, or geographic revenue split was disclosed, so the driver of the H2 revenue step-down is not identifiable.
• No forward-work balance, booking pipeline, or FY23 guidance was provided, so the path to cash breakeven is unstated.

This briefing cannot assess share count changes, dilution from the apparent raise, or the quality of revenue by channel or customer from the supplied materials.

Key metrics

Analytical metrics

This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.