FCF burned NZ$34.5m as capex surged 122.5% on revenue growth of 43.8%

Revenue rose 43.8% to NZ$17.9m, with segment revenue of NZ$19.8m beating the midpoint of the NZ$18.5m–NZ$20.5m guidance range, while online travel booking volumes jumped 67% to 2.15 million. Despite that recovery, operating losses widened: NPAT declined 22.4% to a loss of NZ$36.0m and PBT worsened 22.7%, reflecting cost growth that outpaced the revenue rebound. Operating cash outflow was broadly flat at NZ$-18.5m versus NZ$-18.0m a year earlier.

The balance sheet was materially reshaped by the equity raise: cash moved from NZ$34.9m to NZ$124.5m, lifting total assets to NZ$167.2m — NZ$42.9m above the historical mean of NZ$124.3m.

Capex at 88.9% of revenue versus 58.3% a year ago explains the FCF step-down. The company is deliberately deploying raise proceeds into product and North American expansion rather than managing toward near-term profitability, so the loss widening is investment-phase math, not a deteriorating core business.

Debtor days of 44.2 are meaningfully elevated relative to Serko's own baseline of 18.9–28.7 days. At 21.9 days above the historical mean, this is worth monitoring: in a transaction-volume recovery with growing Booking.com for Business exposure, receivables timing could reflect mix or platform-related settlement lags. If it persists it represents cash-flow slippage on an already negative-OCF base.

The H2 shape showed meaningful improvement. The HY22 interims recorded NPAT of NZ$-15.2m; the implied second-half NPAT was NZ$-20.8m, meaning H2 was the heavier loss period despite a stronger booking environment. This suggests cost step-ups and investment deployment were concentrated in the second half, which matters for the trajectory entering FY23.

The 67% growth in online bookings signals improving operating leverage potential as volumes normalise, and management cited average revenue per booking rising 8% to NZ$5.80.

No formal FY23 financial targets are disclosed in this release. The company is in an explicit investment phase with average cash burn of approximately NZ$3.0m per month cited in the presentation materials and NZ$124.5m of cash on hand. The key uncertainty is whether booking-volume momentum can sustain pace sufficient to bend the FCF curve before the company needs to revisit the capital markets.

However, the reported NPAT and FCF are heavily investment-shaped rather than reflective of underlying earnings power. With capex at 88.9% of revenue and capitalised development alone at NZ$15.3m, a significant portion of FY22 spending is being deferred to the income statement via future amortisation. This means reported losses are not a clean read on the cash economics going forward; the amortisation drag will build.

Cash quality is constrained: OCF of NZ$-18.5m was flat year-on-year despite 43.8% revenue growth, implying operating scale benefits were absorbed by cost growth. FCF of NZ$-34.5m against the historical range of NZ$-5.5m to NZ$1.3m is structural at current investment levels. Debtor days of 44.2 against the historical baseline mean of 22.3 days represents the most concrete near-term watch item for cash conversion.

This briefing cannot assess whether the Booking.com for Business channel concentration creates renewal or renegotiation risk that would alter the forward revenue trajectory.