Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue rose 47.4% to $61.1m (from $41.5m), and EBITDAFI stepped up to $6.1m from $1.0m, driven by the January GetThere acquisition and 40% customer growth versus the prior comparable period. Despite the operating-line expansion, losses widened further down the income statement: PBT worsened from $(4.6)m to $(8.5)m, and NPAT deteriorated 86.2% from $(5.1)m to $(9.5)m. Operating cash flow climbed 82.6% to $8.6m, and company-reported free cash flow rose to $3.0m from $1.3m. However, trade receivables more than doubled to $8.0m (from $3.3m), cash ended lower at $20.0m (from $22.0m), total liabilities grew 120.5% to $31.2m, and equity fell 18.0% to $92.2m.
What matters
- Operating-line acceleration is real but does not flow through to NPAT. EBITDAFI grew $5.1m while NPAT deteriorated by $(4.4)m — the widening gap reflects higher depreciation, amortisation and finance costs associated with the GetThere acquisition rather than tax distortion (effective tax rate 11.6% vs 10.6%, no discontinued operations disclosed). PBT is the cleaner read and it went backwards by 84.4%.
- Receivables-driven working capital build. Trade debtors of $8.0m represent 144.1% growth against 47.4% revenue growth, pushing receivable days from 28.7 to 47.5. This is the single largest quality signal in the result.
- Balance-sheet cushion narrowed. Cash is down $1.9m and equity is down $20.3m, while liabilities more than doubled. The group still appears net cash (no borrowings disclosed), but the margin of safety has compressed materially post-acquisition.
Expectations
No numeric forward guidance or forward-work disclosure was captured in the release, and no quantified FY26 target is provided. The release excerpts reference "1H26" and a $61.8m half-period total income figure, suggesting this is an interim print; prior-period shape commentary is therefore limited. What the release does support is a step-change in US revenue scale from GetThere, with stabilising churn (~1% of ARR on key accounts). What it does not support is a read-through to sustainable net profitability — the acquisition accretion is visible at EBITDAFI but not yet at NPAT.
Quality of result
Mixed. The EBITDAFI jump to $6.1m is genuine operating progress, and OCF of $8.6m exceeds EBITDAFI (OCF/EBITDAFI of 140.2%), which looks healthy in isolation. But that ratio compares to 468.5% last period, so cash conversion on an EBITDAFI basis has deteriorated sharply — and much of the OCF benefit reflects timing rather than margin: receivables grew $4.7m, a direct drag against what a lower receivable-days profile would have produced. Capex also stepped up to $4.3m from $2.8m (7.1% of revenue), leaving reported FCF at $3.0m. Stripping lease outflows, pre-lease FCF was $4.2m versus $1.9m. The durable improvement is smaller than the headline OCF figure implies, and the widening NPAT loss reflects the fuller cost of owning GetThere.
Unresolved
- What share of the 47.4% revenue lift is organic versus contributed by GetThere, and what is the underlying growth rate of the pre-acquisition business?
- Why did receivable days rise to 47.5 — is this a mix shift toward US/GetThere customer payment terms or a one-off timing effect?
- What is the path from $6.1m EBITDAFI to positive NPAT, given the $(3.9)m gap between PBT and EBITDAFI has widened?
- No statutory reconciliation of EBITDAFI/EBITDAF or company-defined FCF to the audited accounts is captured in the extract.
- No dividend was disclosed in the extracted data.
This briefing cannot assess segment-level profitability, GetThere acquisition accounting detail, organic-versus-acquired revenue split, or forward guidance, because none of these were present in the extracted materials.
Key metrics
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $61.1m | $41.5m | +47.4% ↑ |
| Net profit after tax | −$9.5b | −$5.1b | -86.2% ↓ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | $8.6b | $4.7b | +82.6% ↑ |
| EBITDAF | $6.1b | $1b | +510.0% ↑ |
| Operating profit | −$3.3b | −$7.9b | +58.1% ↑ |
| Profit before tax | −$8.5b | −$4.6b | -84.4% ↓ |
| Total assets | $123.4m | $126.7m | -2.6% ↓ |
Analytical metrics
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| OCF / EBITDAF (cash conversion) | 140.2% | 468.5% | deteriorated |
| FCF pre-lease | $4.2m | $1.9m | +$2.3m |
| FCF post-lease | $3.0m | $1.3m | +$1.7m |
| FCF / NPAT | 31.5% | 25.4% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 7.1% | 6.7% | — |
| Capex | $4.3b | −$2.8b | +$7.1b |
| Free cash flow | $3b | $1.3b | +$1.7b |
| Debtor days | 47.5 | 28.7 | +18.8 days |
| Operating working capital | $8.0m | $3.3m | +$4.7m absorbed |
| Trade debtors | $8b | $3.3b | +$4.7b |
| Net debt | −$20.0m | −$22.0m | +$1.9m |
| Net debt / EBITDAF | -3.30x | -22.00x | Weakening |
| ROE (annualised) | -10.3% | -4.5% | Weakening |
| HY26 share of FY26 revenue | 67.8% | — | Other half was 32.2% |
| HY26 share of FY26 EBITDAF | 16.4% | — | Other half was 83.6% |
| HY26 share of FY26 NPAT | 53.7% | — | Other half was 46.3% |
| Profit from continuing operations | −$9.5b | −$5.1b | −$4.4b |
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.