Revenue up 90.4% and EBITDAF loss cut 96%, but cash quality lags

The PBT loss narrowed 65.1% to -$6.8m and NPAT improved 63.7% to -$7.2m. Management's EBITDAF loss measure was $0.8m, a 96% improvement.

Operating cash flow swung from -$17.0m to +$2.2m, and closing cash stood at $84.3m. Working capital absorbed $11.1m as contract assets emerged at $11.8m (a new balance), while trade debtors actually fell 17.6% to $2.8m. Capex stepped up to $5.1m from $0.2m, almost entirely capitalised development cost. FY24 total income guidance was lifted to $67m–$74m.

• Revenue nearly doubled while the EBITDAF loss was almost eliminated, evidencing genuine fixed-cost absorption. However, the $2.2m of operating cash inflow is flattered by $5.1m of development cost being capitalised rather than expensed (14.3% of revenue, versus 1.2% in the prior comparable). On a pre-lease free cash flow basis Serko still burned -$2.9m, so the business is not yet self-funding.
• Contract assets at $11.8m absorb most of the working-capital build. Receivable days actually shortened from 32.5 to 14.1, so collections from billed customers improved. The cash is sitting in revenue that has been recognised but not yet billed or settled — likely linked to the Booking.com partnership economics. This matters because reported revenue and contract assets are now growing in parallel, and the cash realisation lag is a new variable to monitor.
• Funding position remains comfortable. Cash of $84.3m, no borrowings, and a halved cash burn versus HY23 mean the runway to the stated FY25 cash-flow-positive target is not at risk on current trajectory. ROE improved to -5.6% from -13.9%.

The supplied second-half shape data shows HY23 represented 105% of FY23 revenue, meaning H2 FY23 was actually slightly negative — that was a recovery-distorted base and is unlikely to recur, but it does mean there is no clean seasonal template for H2 FY24.

The release reiterates a return to cash-flow positive during FY25. This half is consistent with that pathway but does not prove it: the swing factors are whether capitalised development intensity holds at ~14% of revenue and whether contract assets convert to cash on a predictable cycle.

Cost discipline against a near-doubling of revenue produced a 96% reduction in EBITDAF loss, and the improvement in receivable days suggests the billed-customer book is being managed tightly. The revenue line itself, dominated by Booking.com volumes, is a function of partnership ramp rather than one-off items, and no non-recurring drivers were flagged.

The cash result is lower quality than the income-statement read implies. Three points stand out:

• Operating cash flow benefited from $5.1m of development costs being directed to investing activities rather than the P&L; this is permissible accounting for a software business but compresses the gap between EBITDAF and cash.
• A $11.1m working-capital build, virtually all in contract assets, means roughly a third of revenue growth has not yet been realised in cash.
• The effective tax position (-4.8% current, -0.7% prior) is small in absolute terms and does not distort the operating read; NPAT and PBT growth are within 1.4 percentage points of each other.

This briefing cannot assess unit economics inside the Booking.com partnership, the cash-conversion profile of contract assets, or the segment-level profitability mix, because none of those are disclosed in the supplied release.