Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue from the sale of goods rose 24.9% to NZ$745.1k from NZ$596.8k, with management attributing growth to a 35% lift in Single Use Sensor unit sales and first sales into Eastern Europe. The reported loss narrowed 16.6% to NZ$1.26m from NZ$1.51m, with PBT and NPAT identical because tax was nil in both halves. Despite the narrower loss, net cash used in operating activities deteriorated 9.3% to NZ$1.72m from NZ$1.57m. Cash and equivalents fell to NZ$3.67m from NZ$4.47m, while gross borrowings were fully repaid (from NZ$436.8k to nil), leaving the business debt-free but with a smaller net cash cushion (NZ$3.67m vs NZ$4.03m). Total equity stepped down to NZ$9.66m from NZ$11.15m.
What matters
- Cash conversion deteriorated despite a smaller loss. Operating outflow widened by NZ$147k even as the loss narrowed by NZ$251k, driven largely by inventory build (up 13.2% to NZ$691.6k) rather than a revenue-scale problem. This is the single most important read on earnings quality.
- Receivables collapse flatters revenue timing. Trade debtors fell from NZ$156.9k to just NZ$6.7k, cutting implied receivable days from ~48 to ~2. That is consistent with cash-on-shipment sales (the kind of early-stage distribution Truscreen has historically flagged) and means the revenue growth is backed by cash receipts, but it also removes receivables as a future working-capital source.
- Runway, not leverage, is the binding constraint. The balance sheet is clean — zero debt, NZ$9.66m equity — but at the current ~NZ$1.7m half-year burn rate, the NZ$3.67m cash balance implies roughly a year of funding before further capital raising or a step-change in revenue is required.
Expectations
No formal guidance, forward-work book, or stated revenue target was disclosed. Seasonality is ambiguous: HY21 represented 52.7% of FY21 revenue and 43.3% of FY21 NPAT, so the prior year was modestly first-half weighted on revenue but second-half weighted on losses. Annualising HY22 revenue gives ~NZ$1.49m, roughly 31.5% above FY21's NZ$1.13m, which would be consistent with a continued growth trajectory but still an order of magnitude below a break-even revenue base given the current cost structure. The release supports a growth-in-volumes narrative; it does not support a near-term path to cash break-even.
Quality of result
The operating improvement looks partly real and partly timing-flattered. Real: SUS volumes +35% and geographic expansion are operational rather than accounting. Timing-flattered: the loss narrowing is helped by zero capex (versus NZ$74.1k prior) and by FX — a NZ$138k positive FX adjustment to cash was recorded in the period. Against that, inventories rose NZ$80.8k, absorbing cash that the P&L does not show. Pre-lease free cash flow worsened marginally to -NZ$1.72m from -NZ$1.65m, and FCF-to-NPAT deteriorated to 136.6% from 109%, confirming cash quality weakened even as the reported loss shrank. No EBITDA, adjusted measure, or segment breakdown was disclosed, limiting how cleanly durability can be assessed.
Unresolved
- What is the gross margin on the 25% higher revenue, and did the SUS mix shift help or hurt unit economics? No gross-margin line was provided.
- Why did inventories build 13% against shipped volumes up 35% — is this pre-positioning for Eastern European orders, or slower inventory turn?
- What is the expected half-on-half cost base, and does management see the ~NZ$1.7m per-half burn as a ceiling or a floor?
- Is a capital raise contemplated given ~two halves of cash at the current burn, and what is the contingency if Eastern European ramp slips?
- No customer, geographic, or distributor concentration was disclosed, which matters given the receivables collapse and the lumpy nature of device sales.
This briefing cannot assess unit economics, distributor pipeline depth, or the probability and terms of any future equity raise, because none of those items were disclosed in the supplied materials.
Key metrics
| Metric | HY22 | HY21 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $745.1m | $596.8m | +24.9% ↑ |
| Net profit after tax | −$1.3b | −$1.5b | +16.6% ↑ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | −$1.7b | −$1.6b | -9.3% ↓ |
| Declared dividend per share | 0.0c | — | — |
| Profit before tax | −$1.3b | −$1.5b | +16.6% ↑ |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $3.7b | $4.5b | -17.8% ↓ |
| Total assets | $10.3b | $12.2b | -15.0% ↓ |
Analytical metrics
| Metric | HY22 | HY21 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| FCF pre-lease | −$1.7b | −$1.6b | −$73m |
| FCF / NPAT | 136.6% | 109.0% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 0.0% | -12.4% | — |
| Capex | $0m | −$74.1m | +$74.1m |
| Debtor days | 1.6 | 47.9 | -46.3 days |
| Inventory days | 169.0 | 186.3 | -17.3 days |
| Trade debtors | $6.7m | $156.9m | −$150.3m |
| Net debt | −$3.7b | −$4b | +$357.3m |
| Gross borrowings | $0m | $436.8m | −$436.8m |
| Payout ratio vs NPAT | 0.0% | — | — |
| Payout ratio vs FCF pre-lease | 0.0% | — | covered |
| ROE (annualised) | -13.0% | -13.5% | Strengthening |
| HY21 share of FY21 revenue | 52.7% | — | Other half was 47.3% |
| HY21 share of FY21 NPAT | 43.3% | — | Other half was 56.7% |
| Profit from continuing operations | −$1.3b | −$1.5b | +$251m |
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.