Revenue fell 39.4% with receivables doubling and H2 cash burn negative

Revenue fell 39.4% to $87.5m, EBITDA swung to an $11.4m loss (which absorbs $13m of non-cash expected credit loss and credit risk provisions), PBT moved to -$64.3m from $18.4m, and NPAT to -$51.4m from $10.8m. Operating cash flow held at $4.1m for the full year only because H1 contributed $16.7m; the implied H2 OCF was -$12.6m. Trade debtors grew 34% to $47.5m, and gross borrowings more than tripled to $36.2m. No final dividend was declared (prior: 2.1cps). Prior-period acquisition activity in FY19 also means the year-on-year comparison is not a clean like-for-like baseline.

Receivable days more than doubled to 198.3 and the company has absorbed $13m of expected credit loss and credit risk provisions through EBITDA. This signals genuine concern about cinema-operator customer survival rather than timing, and any further deterioration would hit EBITDA and cash directly because the provisions are not yet realised write-offs.

The cash position is balance-sheet engineered, not operating-driven. The $67.1m year-end balance is materially higher than $19.5m a year earlier, but is funded by $24.4m of additional gross borrowings (now $36.2m, up 207%) on essentially flat equity of $163.1m. Underlying H2 cash burn ran at $3.7m per month within management's $3-4m forecast range, meaning operating cash generation reversed in the second half.

Tax distortion makes PBT the cleaner operating read. The current effective tax rate was -11.8% versus 30.4% prior, with NPAT growth of -575.9% against PBT growth of -449.5% — a 126.4pp gap. The loss-position tax benefit partially flatters NPAT, but PBT shows the unflattered operating swing.

Management commentary references a product launch in H1 2022 and "the coming recovery", and notes that H2 cash burn of $3.7m per month landed within the forecast $3-4m range. The release confirms the depth of the COVID hit but does not establish what a normalised revenue or earnings base looks like once cinemas reopen and licensing volumes recover.

With $67.1m cash plus $39m undrawn debt facilities, liquidity covers roughly 28 months at the H2 burn rate before recovery is required. That matters because the survival of Vista's customer base — global cinema operators — is the variable that drives both the receivables recovery and the revenue rebound, and neither is within management's control.

Revenue, EBITDA, and cash conversion are all materially impaired by the cinema-industry shutdown, and the implied -$12.6m H2 OCF confirms that operating cash turned negative once the H1 boost (which included $3.8m of local subsidies) faded. Current OCF/EBITDA at -36.0% and FCF/NPAT at -5.3% reflect the loss position rather than offering signal on conversion efficiency.

The non-cash $13m credit loss provision sits inside EBITDA and reflects real customer-survival risk that may not reverse; further provisioning remains possible. The $67.1m cash balance is supported by $24.4m of new debt rather than internally generated cash, and receivables at 198 days are well beyond normal commercial terms. ROE swung to -31.5% from 6.6%, and capital is preserved (equity $163.1m, essentially flat) but the operating economics have not been tested in a normalised environment within this result.

This briefing cannot assess whether global cinema attendance and exhibitor balance sheets will recover sufficiently to restore Vista's licensing volumes and receivables collectability.