Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue rose 9.5% to NZ$164.3m, with management citing 25% SaaS revenue growth and continued ARR build. EBITDA grew 30.6% to NZ$28.2m, lifting the EBITDA margin from roughly 14.4% to 17.2%. PBT jumped 144.4% to NZ$4.4m, and NPAT swung from a NZ$1.0m loss to a NZ$1.9m profit.
Operating cash flow climbed 65.5% to NZ$27.8m. The more striking number is capex, which fell from NZ$17.7m to NZ$0.6m, taking pre-lease free cash flow from NZ$(0.9)m to NZ$27.2m. Cash eased slightly to NZ$20.0m (from NZ$21.8m) while gross borrowings reduced to NZ$19.3m, leaving the group still narrowly net cash. Mix was broadly stable: Cinema 79.5% of revenue, Film 20.5%, with both segments showing modest contribution-margin uplift.
What matters
- Capex collapse drives the cash story. Prior-year capex of NZ$17.7m was almost entirely capitalised development (NZ$17.2m); current-year capex is essentially just PP&E (NZ$0.6m). That single line explains most of the NZ$28m FCF swing and warrants explanation before the cash conversion ratio (98.6% of EBITDA) is treated as a steady-state run-rate.
- PBT is the cleaner operating read. PBT growth of 144.4% is more informative than the headline NPAT swing because the tax line moved violently — effective tax rate of 40.9% in FY25 versus -133.3% in FY24. The underlying continuing-operations profit of NZ$2.6m (vs NZ$(0.6)m) confirms genuine operating progress, but bottom-line growth percentages overstate it.
- Margin expansion looks operational. EBITDA up 30.6% on revenue up 9.5% implies real operating leverage rather than a one-off, and segment contribution margins improved in both Cinema (~33.6% → ~34.1%) and Film (~39.7% → ~42.4%). Receivable days also improved to 69.3 from 76.7, supporting the cash-flow uplift on its own merits.
Expectations
No quantitative guidance, forward-work backlog, or stated FY26 targets were provided in the supplied disclosures, so this release cannot be benchmarked against management aspirations. On shape, HY25 delivered NZ$77.0m revenue and a NZ$1.5m loss, implying a second-half of NZ$87.3m revenue, NZ$18.2m EBITDA and NZ$3.4m NPAT — clearly a second-half weighted profile. The CEO's reference to "marquee clients in advanced" stages of onboarding signals revenue momentum into FY26, but no contracted dollar figure is disclosed to size it.
Quality of result
The operating quality is genuine but flattered. EBITDA-to-OCF conversion of 98.6% (versus 77.8%) and a 7.4-day improvement in receivable days are clean working-capital signals. Margin expansion is corroborated at the segment level rather than residing only in unallocated costs.
The cash and FCF result, however, leans heavily on the disappearance of capitalised development — capex as a share of revenue dropped from 11.8% to 0.4%. If FY24's NZ$17.2m of capitalised development is now being expensed through the P&L, EBITDA's 30.6% growth becomes more impressive; if instead the development cycle has simply paused, FY26 capex will likely normalise upward and the FCF picture will compress materially. The supplied excerpts do not resolve which of these is occurring.
Other quality notes: equity grew only 2.6% to NZ$149.7m despite a return to profit, total liabilities rose 16.3% to NZ$91.2m without a matching rise in borrowings, and FX created a NZ$(0.6)m drag on cash versus a NZ$0.6m tailwind in FY24.
Unresolved
- What drove capex from NZ$17.7m to NZ$0.6m — accounting policy change, development cycle phasing, or genuine reduction in spend — and what is the indicated FY26 run-rate?
- What is the dollar value of ARR and the contracted onboarding pipeline behind the "marquee clients" reference, and how does it underwrite FY26 revenue?
- What explains the 16.3% rise in total liabilities to NZ$91.2m given borrowings actually fell? (Likely deferred revenue, but not confirmed in the supplied data.)
- Why no dividend declared despite a return to profit and a NZ$27.2m pre-lease FCF outcome — is capital being retained for delivery capacity expansion?
This briefing cannot assess Vista's competitive position in cloud cinema software, the durability of SaaS pricing, or the underlying cash quality without seeing the FY26 capex trajectory and a SaaS/ARR disclosure in dollar terms.
Key metrics
| Metric | FY25 | FY24 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $164.3m | $150m | +9.5% ↑ |
| EBITDA | $28.2m | $21.6m | +30.6% ↑ |
| Net profit after tax | $1.9m | −$1m | +290.0% ↑ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | $27.8m | $16.8m | +65.5% ↑ |
| Profit before tax | $4.4m | $1.8m | +144.4% ↑ |
| Total assets | $240.9m | $224.3m | +7.4% ↑ |
Segment breakdown
| Segment | Current revenue | Prior revenue | Current result | Mix shift |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cinema segment | $130.6m | $119.8m | $44.5m | -0.4pp |
| Film segment | $33.7m | $30.2m | $14.3m | +0.4pp |
Analytical metrics
| Metric | FY25 | FY24 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| PBT growth | +144.4% | — | cleaner earnings measure |
| Effective tax rate | 40.9% | -133.3% | — |
| OCF / EBITDA (cash conversion) | 98.6% | 77.8% | stable |
| FCF pre-lease | $27.2m | −$0.9m | +$28.1m |
| FCF / NPAT | n/m | 90.0% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 0.4% | 11.8% | — |
| Capex | $0.6m | $17.7m | −$17.1m |
| Debtor days | 69.3 | 76.7 | -7.4 days |
| Trade debtors | $31.2m | $31.5m | −$0.3m |
| Net debt | −$0.7m | −$1.1m | +$0.4m |
| Net debt / EBITDA | -0.02x | -0.05x | Weakening |
| Gross borrowings | $19.3m | $20.7m | −$1.4m |
| Payout ratio vs NPAT | 0.0% | — | — |
| Payout ratio vs FCF pre-lease | 0.0% | — | covered |
| ROE (annualised) | 1.3% | -0.7% | Strengthening |
| HY25 share of FY25 revenue | 46.9% | — | Other half was 53.1% |
| HY25 share of FY25 EBITDA | 35.5% | — | Other half was 64.5% |
| HY25 share of FY25 NPAT | -78.9% | — | Other half was 178.9% |
| Profit from continuing operations | $2.6m | −$0.6m | +$3.2m |
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.
Source-backed analysis from the filing set attached to this briefing.