Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue fell to $11.8m from $47.6m (-75.1%) and NPAT fell to $5.0m from $22.9m (-78.1%), with PBT down the same 78.1% to $7.0m. EBITDA was $5.8m (prior period EBITDA not separately disclosed in the comparable line). Operating cash flow dropped to $2.5m from $10.8m (-76.9%). Despite the earnings compression, the balance sheet strengthened: cash rose to $45.0m from $15.1m, total liabilities fell to $1.3m from $6.2m, and total equity edged up to $305.3m from $300.6m. The company cites the continued property downturn and, importantly, the absence of the "one-off high value land sales" that inflated HY22. Segment disclosure shows residential land development dominated at ~89.8% of revenue; no prior-period segment split was disclosed.
What matters
- Collapse is explained, not obscured. The PBT-to-NPAT gap is a clean 28.0% effective tax rate in both periods, so there is no tax distortion and no discontinued operation. The decline reflects volume and the non-repeat of HY22 one-off land sales, as management states directly.
- Balance sheet absorbs the cycle. Cash nearly tripled year-on-year to $45.0m while total liabilities dropped to $1.3m. Gross borrowings are not disclosed but appear immaterial. This is what allows management to "target growth" despite a much weaker trading backdrop.
- Run-rate is materially below the FY22 anchor. Annualised HY23 revenue of ~$23.7m is roughly a third of FY22's $67.1m. ROE fell to 1.65% from 7.62% on a half-year basis. The question is cyclical depth, not solvency.
Expectations
No numerical guidance or forward work disclosures were provided, and the company gives no full-year target. Seasonality context works against the reader here: in FY22, HY1 delivered 70.9% of full-year revenue and 73.4% of NPAT, so a weaker first half does not mechanically imply a stronger second half. Using that historical shape, the implied 2H22 was only ~$19.5m of revenue and ~$8.3m of NPAT. Applied to HY23, even a seasonally typical second half would leave FY23 well below FY22. The release supports the view that the cycle is weighing on volumes; it does not support a specific recovery timetable.
Quality of result
The result is low-quality in magnitude but clean in composition. Cash conversion deteriorated materially: OCF/EBITDA was 43.0% in HY23, and OCF fell 76.9% against a 78.1% PBT fall, so on that narrow comparison cash tracked earnings. However, receivables days blew out to ~55.9 days from ~5.7 days, with trade debtors up 145% to $3.6m — a meaningful working capital drag on an already small revenue base. Pre-lease FCF was still positive at ~$2.2m after $0.3m capex, but $0.29m of capex on $11.8m of revenue (2.5%) is an order of magnitude higher than HY22's near-zero, driven by $0.29m of investment property development. There are no disclosed non-recurring items in HY23 to strip out; the weakness is the underlying run-rate.
Unresolved
- No current-period dividend figure is provided in the release excerpt; the FY22 anchor references a 3.5 cents fully-imputed dividend, but HY23 quantum is not visible here.
- No prior-period segment split, so the mix shift within residential land development versus investment property cannot be quantified.
- No forward work, contracted sales backlog, or settlement pipeline disclosure to calibrate 2H23.
- No NTA per share, gross borrowings, or net debt figures, limiting leverage and valuation ratios.
- Why did receivables days spike so sharply against falling sales — a timing effect at period-end or a change in settlement behaviour?
This briefing cannot assess CDI's land bank carrying values, section-pricing trajectory, or the likelihood and timing of any second-half sales recovery.
Key metrics
| Metric | HY23 | HY22 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $11.8m | $47.6m | -75.1% ↓ |
| EBITDA | $5799m | — | — |
| Net profit after tax | $5024m | $22899m | -78.1% ↓ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | $2495m | $10802m | -76.9% ↓ |
| Operating profit | $5271m | $31294m | -83.2% ↓ |
| Profit before tax | $6978m | $31805m | -78.1% ↓ |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $45.0m | $15.1m | +198.6% ↑ |
| Total assets | $306.5m | $306.7m | -0.1% ↓ |
Reference: annolyse.ai/briefings/cdi-hy23
Segment breakdown
| Segment | Current revenue | Prior revenue | Current result | Mix shift |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Residential land development | $10.7m | — | $4.5m | n/a |
| Investment property | $1.2m | — | $0.5m | n/a |
Reference: annolyse.ai/briefings/cdi-hy23
Analytical metrics
| Metric | HY23 | HY22 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| PBT growth | -78.1% | — | — |
| Effective tax rate | 28.0% | 28.0% | — |
| OCF / EBITDA (cash conversion) | 43.0% | — | deteriorated |
| FCF pre-lease | $2.2m | $10.8m | −$8.6m |
| FCF / NPAT | 43.9% | 47.1% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 2.5% | 0.0% | — |
| Capex | $292.0m | — | — |
| Debtor days | 55.9 | 5.7 | +50.3 days |
| Trade debtors | $3638.0m | $1483.0m | +$2155.0m |
| Payout ratio vs NPAT | 0.0% | — | — |
| Payout ratio vs FCF pre-lease | 0.0% | — | covered |
| ROE (annualised) | 1.6% | 7.6% | Weakening |
| HY22 share of FY22 revenue | 70.9% | — | Other half was 29.1% |
| HY22 share of FY22 NPAT | 73.4% | — | Other half was 26.6% |
| Profit from continuing operations | $5024.0m | — | — |
Reference: annolyse.ai/briefings/cdi-hy23
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX/ASX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.