Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue rose 51.7% to NZ$1b, reflecting the enlarged post-Apollo group, but profitability went backwards: PBT fell 17.6% to NZ$55.2m and NPAT fell 23.8% to NZ$38.0m. Operating cash flow swung sharply from an outflow of NZ$61.4m in FY23 to an inflow of NZ$172.4m. The balance sheet, however, expanded markedly: total assets rose 17.9% to NZ$1.6b, gross borrowings rose 70.9% to NZ$618.7m, equity fell 12.2% to NZ$536.3m, and estimated net debt rose to NZ$532.6m from NZ$285.1m. The final dividend was cut to 7.0 cents per share from 15.0 cents. Segment disclosure shows Tourism as the dominant and higher-margin contributor (c.12.6% segment margin on NZ$869.4m) while Manufacturing & Sales earned only c.4.4% on NZ$271.7m.
What matters
- Earnings quality vs. headline scale. The 51.7% revenue uplift is largely inorganic; the cleaner read is PBT down 17.6%. NPAT fell harder (‑23.8%) because the effective tax rate rose to 31.1% from 25.6%, so the 6.1pp gap between PBT and NPAT growth is a tax distortion, not an operating deterioration beyond what PBT already shows.
- Leverage direction. Net debt nearly doubled to NZ$532.6m while equity fell, consistent with funding the Apollo-related expansion. Against a lower earnings base, this is an unambiguous weakening in balance-sheet quality.
- Dividend cover has broken. Pre-lease free cash flow was only NZ$15.0m (OCF NZ$172.4m less capex NZ$157.4m). The 7.0c final alone implies a payout of 45.7% of NPAT but 115.6% of pre-lease FCF — i.e. the dividend is not covered by free cash on the period's cash generation, and the halving of the final dividend should be read in that context.
Expectations
No quantitative FY25 guidance, forward-work figure, or stated targets were provided. The shape context is striking: H1 FY24 delivered just 17.4% of full-year revenue and a NZ$4.0m loss, implying H2 revenue of c.NZ$832.4m and H2 NPAT of c.NZ$42.1m. That makes FY24 a heavily second-half-weighted year, and any read-through to FY25 depends on whether the H2 run-rate in vehicle sales margins and rental demand — both described qualitatively as improving — persists. The release does not support a quantified forward view.
Quality of result
Mixed. The operating cash turnaround is genuine in size but is flattered by a low prior-year comparator (FY23 OCF was a NZ$61.4m outflow) and by working capital release: inventory days fell to c.60.2 from c.100.0 and receivable days to c.15.5 from c.21.2. That is a one-off benefit that will not repeat at the same magnitude. Capex intensity also stepped down to 15.6% of revenue from 49.3%, which mechanically widened FCF but reflects the fleet build-out being behind rather than a structural change. EBITDA was not disclosed, no non-GAAP reconciliation was provided, and FY24 segment disclosure has been reorganised versus FY23, limiting like-for-like segment comparability. Underlying operating performance, stripped of acquisition and working-capital help, is not clearly improving.
Unresolved
- How much of the 51.7% revenue growth is organic versus acquisition contribution, and what is the like-for-like Tourism performance?
- What is the FY24 group EBITDA and, critically, net debt/EBITDA — without this, the true leverage read against covenants cannot be framed.
- Why did the effective tax rate jump to 31.1%, and is that a new baseline?
- Is the step-down in capex intensity temporary (fleet investment already pulled forward) or a new run-rate?
- What is the sustainable dividend policy given pre-lease FCF only just covered the period's distribution in aggregate terms?
This briefing cannot assess valuation, covenant headroom, or the quality of the Apollo integration, as NTA, EBITDA, debt terms and acquisition-contribution splits were not in the supplied data.
Key metrics
| Metric | FY24 | FY23 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1b | $663.8m | +51.7% ↑ |
| Net profit after tax | $38m | $49.9m | -23.8% ↓ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | $172.4m | −$61.4m | +380.7% ↑ |
| Final dividend per share | 7.0c | 15.0c | -53.3% ↓ |
| Profit before tax | $55.2m | $67m | -17.6% ↓ |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $86m | $76.8m | +12.1% ↑ |
| Total assets | $1.6b | $1.3b | +17.9% ↑ |
Segment breakdown
| Segment | Current revenue | Prior revenue | Current result | Mix shift |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tourism | $869.4m | — | $109.4m | n/a |
| Manufacturing & Sales | $271.7m | — | $11.9m | n/a |
Analytical metrics
| Metric | FY24 | FY23 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| PBT growth | -17.6% | — | cleaner earnings measure |
| Effective tax rate | 31.1% | 25.6% | — |
| FCF pre-lease | $15m | −$388.8m | +$403.8m |
| FCF / NPAT | 39.6% | -779.9% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | 15.6% | 49.3% | — |
| Capex | −$157.4m | $327.3m | −$484.7m |
| Debtor days | 15.5 | 21.2 | -5.6 days |
| Inventory days | 60.2 | 100.0 | -39.9 days |
| Operating working capital | $208.9m | $220.4m | −$11.5m absorbed |
| Trade debtors | $42.9m | $38.5m | +$4.4m |
| Net debt | $532.6m | $285.1m | +$247.5m |
| Gross borrowings | $618.7m | $361.9m | +$256.8m |
| Payout ratio vs NPAT | 45.7% | — | — |
| Payout ratio vs FCF pre-lease | 115.6% | — | not covered |
| ROE (annualised) | 7.1% | 8.2% | Weakening |
| HY24 share of FY24 revenue | 17.4% | — | Other half was 82.6% |
| HY24 share of FY24 NPAT | -10.6% | — | Other half was 110.6% |
| Profit from continuing operations | $38m | $49.9m | −$11.8m |
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.
Source-backed analysis from the filing set attached to this briefing.