Table of Contents
What changed
Revenue declined 7.0% to NZ$937.2m. Profit before tax swung from NZ$55.2m to a NZ$5.0m loss, and statutory NPAT moved from NZ$38.0m to a NZ$25.8m loss. Management also disclosed underlying NPAT of NZ$28.7m, down 45% from NZ$51.8m.
Mix shifted meaningfully toward services: sale of services revenue rose 10% to NZ$486.5m and now represents 51.9% of revenue versus 43.9% a year ago, with closing fleet up 8%. The decline was concentrated in vehicle sales, where ex-rental and retail RV margins compressed.
Operating cash flow fell from NZ$172.4m to NZ$28.6m (-83.4%). Capex also dropped sharply to NZ$38.4m from NZ$157.4m. Net debt improved to NZ$492.3m from NZ$532.6m, gross borrowings fell NZ$76.7m, and equity rose to NZ$577.9m. The final dividend was cut to 4.0 cents from 7.0 cents.
What matters
- H2 collapse is the central fact. HY25 NPAT was a NZ$25.3m profit; full-year NPAT is a NZ$25.8m loss, implying roughly NZ$51.0m of second-half losses. Revenue split was roughly even (HY25 at 48.9%), so the H2 damage was margin-driven, not volume-driven.
- Statutory vs underlying gap of ~NZ$54.5m is unusually wide. Underlying NPAT of NZ$28.7m versus statutory NZ$(25.8)m signals material one-offs, but the supplied materials do not itemise the bridge. The FY25 effective tax rate of 420.7% on a small PBT loss shows the tax line distorts the statutory read; PBT growth of -109% is the cleaner operating indicator.
- Deleveraging is the offset. Net debt fell NZ$40.4m and inventory was actively reduced (over NZ$35m taken out of Australian retail RV). Capital discipline is doing real work even as earnings deteriorate.
Expectations
No FY26 guidance or forward-work balance was supplied, so there is no target against which to benchmark. The H1/H2 pattern is the most useful shape signal: the business entered FY25 profitable at the half and then deteriorated sharply, driven by the vehicle sales channel rather than rentals. The release does not support a read that H2 weakness has stabilised; it does support the read that the services (rental) base continues to grow at a double-digit rate.
Quality of result
Mixed-to-poor. Three flags:
- Cash conversion deteriorated materially. OCF fell 83.4% against revenue down only 7%. Pre-lease free cash flow was NZ$(9.8)m versus NZ$15.0m prior, so the declared dividend is not covered by pre-lease FCF.
- Working capital helped but is not a durable lever. Receivable days fell to 8.4 from 15.5, releasing cash, and inventory days edged up only 4.5 days despite the retail RV clearance. The operating working capital reduction of NZ$21.4m is a one-off timing benefit, not a repeatable tailwind.
- Capex step-down flatters leverage. Gross capex of NZ$38.4m versus NZ$157.4m a year ago is below any reasonable fleet-maintenance run rate for an 8%-expanded fleet. The deleveraging is partly a pause in investment, not structural cash generation.
The 45% decline in underlying NPAT is a cleaner read on operating performance than either the statutory loss or the PBT swing.
Unresolved
- What comprises the ~NZ$54.5m gap between statutory and underlying NPAT? The excerpts reference "expected" underlying drivers but no itemised reconciliation is supplied.
- What drove the 420.7% effective tax rate — deferred tax movements, non-deductible impairments, or jurisdictional mix?
- Is the H2 vehicle-sales margin compression cyclical (inventory clearance now complete) or structural (used RV pricing reset)?
- What is the normalised capex run rate required to sustain an 8%-larger fleet, and does the reinstated capex envelope leave room for the 50% underlying payout policy?
- No segment-level disclosure, no net-debt-to-EBITDA ratio, and no forward-work or guidance were supplied.
This briefing cannot assess the composition of the underlying-to-statutory adjustments, segment-level profitability, or forward trading conditions because those disclosures are not in the supplied materials.
Key metrics
| Metric | FY25 | FY24 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $937.2m | $1b | -7.0% ↓ |
| Net profit after tax | −$25.8m | $38m | -167.8% ↓ |
| Net cash inflow from operating activities | $28.6m | $172.4m | -83.4% ↓ |
| Final dividend per share | 4.0c | 7.0c | -42.9% ↓ |
| Operating profit | $41.7m | $83.2m | -49.8% ↓ |
| Profit before tax | −$5m | $55.2m | -109.0% ↓ |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $49.7m | $86m | -42.2% ↓ |
| Total assets | $1.6b | $1.6b | -0.6% ↓ |
Analytical metrics
| Metric | FY25 | FY24 | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effective tax rate | n/m (loss period) | 31.1% | current loss period |
| FCF pre-lease | −$9.8m | $15m | −$24.9m |
| FCF / NPAT | 38.2% | 39.6% | complementary conversion metric |
| Capex % revenue | -4.1% | -15.6% | — |
| Capex | −$38.4m | −$157.4m | +$119m |
| Debtor days | 8.4 | 15.5 | -7.1 days |
| Inventory days | 64.7 | 60.1 | +4.5 days |
| Operating working capital | $187.5m | $208.9m | −$21.4m absorbed |
| Trade debtors | $21.6m | $42.9m | −$21.3m |
| Net debt | $492.3m | $532.6m | −$40.4m |
| Gross borrowings | $542m | $618.7m | −$76.7m |
| Payout ratio vs NPAT | -34.1% | — | — |
| Payout ratio vs FCF pre-lease | -89.4% | — | not covered |
| ROE (annualised) | -4.5% | 7.1% | Weakening |
| HY25 share of FY25 revenue | 48.9% | — | Other half was 51.1% |
| HY25 share of FY25 NPAT | -98.0% | — | Other half was 198.0% |
| Profit from continuing operations | −$25.8m | $38m | −$63.8m |
This analysis was generated using Annolyse, an AI-powered tool that analyses NZX company announcements. The analysis is based on available company filings and standard Annolyse calculations. This is general information only and does not constitute financial advice. The analysis may contain errors. Always read the original company filings and consult a licensed financial adviser before making investment decisions.